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Abstract
We study electoral campaign management scenarios in which an external party can
buy votes, i.e., pay the voters to promote its preferred candidate in their preference
rankings. The external party’s goal is to make its preferred candidate a winner while
paying as little as possible. We describe a 2-approximation algorithm for this problem
for a large class of electoral systems known as scoring rules. Our result holds even for
weighted voters, and has applications for campaign management in commercial settings.
We also give approximation algorithms for our problem for two Condorcet-consistent
rules, namely, the Copeland rule and maximin.
1 Introduction
Elections and voting play an important role in the functioning of the modern society. In the
standard model of voting, each voter’s preferences are represented by a total order over the
alternatives (candidates), and some voting rule is used to determine the election winner(s).
However, in practice, the voters’ preferences are often flexible, and it is possible to affect the
outcome of the election by campaigning for or against a certain candidate. Indeed, campaign
management is a multi-million dollar industry, and there is overwhelming evidence that the
amount of money invested into a candidate’s campaign is strongly correlated with her
chances of winning the election.
The notion of bribery proposed by Faliszewski, Hemaspaandra, and Hemaspaandra [6]
can be viewed as a formal model of electoral campaign management. In the model of [6],
each (possibly weighted) voter is associated with a certain price, and, by paying the price,
the briber can change that voter’s vote in any way she likes. The briber’s goal, then, is to get
a particular candidate elected, subject to a budget constraint. To connect this description
with our original campaign management scenario, observe that bribing a (weighted) voter
can be interpreted as mounting an election campaign targeted at a particular group of voters
with identical preferences.
However, this interpretation does not take into account that in practice it may be
relatively easy to convince a voter to make small changes to his vote, but hard or impossible
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to convince him to adopt an entirely new preference ordering. To remedy this, several
subsequent papers [5, 7, 4] allow the briber to modify the voters’ preferences in a more fine-
grained manner. In [5] and [7], the authors depart from the assumption that the voters are
represented by the preference orders. We will therefore focus on the framework of [4], which
operates in the standard model of voting, and assumes that the briber can pay each voter
to swap any two candidates that are adjacent in that voter’s ordering; this type of bribery
is called swap bribery. In the context of campaign management, such a swap corresponds to
an ad that compares two particular candidates. A special case of swap bribery that was also
suggested in [4] is shift bribery, where the briber is limited to buying swaps that involve her
preferred candidate; in effect, this is equivalent to allowing the briber to shift her preferred
candidate up in the voters’ preference orderings. The constraint that a campaign ad should
involve the briber’s preferred candidate is very natural from the ethics perspective; as we
will see later, it also leads to more tractable computational problems.
The complexity-theoretic study of swap and shift bribery was initiated in [4], where
the authors show that the associated computational problem is hard for many voting rules.
However, campaign management can be naturally viewed as an optimization problem, and
hence we can approach it using the framework of approximation algorithms. This line of
research was first suggested in [4], where the authors give a 2-approximation algorithm for
shift bribery under the Borda rule. We expand the study of approximation algorithms for
campaign management to voting rules other than Borda, and to weighted voters.
Our main result is a 2-approximation algorithm for shift bribery under all scoring rules
(a large class of voting rules, which includes Borda); our result holds even for weighted
voters. Under a scoring rule, each candidate gets a certain number of points from each
voter, which is determined by that candidate’s position in the voter’s preferences, and the
winner is the candidate with the maximum number of points. Unlike most of the existing
algorithms for scoring rules (see, e.g., [6]), our algorithm does not assume that the number
of candidates is constant, but rather accepts the scoring vector as an input. Our proof
has an unusual structure: we first design a pseudopolynomial 2-approximation algorithm
for our problem, then convert it into a (2 + ε)-approximation scheme, and finally turn
the (2 + ε)-approximation scheme into a 2-approximation algorithm using a bootstrapping
argument.
Interestingly, shift bribery under scoring rules provides mathematical framework for
campaign management scenarios that are not related to elections. Consider, for example,
an advertiser in a sponsored search setting who wants to ensure that his ads get more
clicks than those of the competitors, and is willing to make an additional investment in his
campaign to achieve that. By associating the competing ads with candidates, search terms
with (weighted) voters, and scores for position i with clickthrough rates for an ad in position
i, we can reduce the advertiser’s problem to shift bribery with weighted voters. This example
suggests that our 2-approximation algorithm can be used for campaign management in a
variety of settings, including—but not limited to—voting.
We also give approximation algorithms for shift bribery under two voting rules that have
2
the attractive property of Condorcet consistency, namely, the Copeland rule and maximin.1
To complement our positive results, we show that, in contrast to shift bribery, swap bribery
is usually hard to approximate. We conclude the paper by suggesting directions for future
work.
2 Preliminaries
In this section we describe relevant notions from computational social choice and define the
shift bribery problem. We take Z+ to be the set of all nonnegative integers.
Elections. An election is a pair E = (C, V ), where C = {c1, . . . cm} is the set of candidates
and V = (v1, . . . , vn) is a collection of voters. Each voter vi is described by her preference
order ≻i, which is a strict linear order over C: c ≻i c′ means that voter vi prefers c to c′.
We will also consider settings where each voter vi has a weight wi; in this case, her vote is
interpreted as wi votes.
A voting rule is a function that given an election E = (C, V ) outputs a set W ⊆ C
of election winners. Note that we do not require the voting rule to produce a unique
winner, i.e., we work in the so-called nonunique-winner model. This approach is standard
in computational social choice literature, as it allows to define classic voting rules (see
below) in a more natural manner. In practice, this means that a voting rule may have to
be combined with a tie-breaking rule.
Voting Rules. We will now describe several well-known voting rules that will be consid-
ered in this paper. All voting rules listed below are defined for an election E = (C, V ) with
C = {c1, . . . , cm}, V = (v
1, . . . , vn). For all rules defined in terms of scores (points), the
winner(s) are the candidate(s) with the maximum score (highest number of points).
Scoring rules. A scoring ruleR~α is described by a vector ~α = (α1, . . . , αm), where αi ∈ Z
+
for i = 1, . . . , n, and α1 ≥ · · · ≥ αm. Under R~α, each candidate ci receives αj points
from each voter that ranks him in the j-th position. Note that each scoring rule is
defined for a fixed number of candidates. Thus, we often consider voting rules that
are defined by families of scoring rules (~αm)m=1,2,..., with one vector for each number
of candidates. In particular, Borda is the rule given by αmj = m− j for j = 1, . . . ,m,
and k-approval is the rule given by αmj = 1 for j ≤ k, α
m
j = 0 for j > k; 1-approval is
also known as plurality.
Condorcet consistent rules. For any ci, cj ∈ C, let NE(ci, cj) denote the number of
voters in E who prefer ci to cj . If NE(ci, cj) > NE(cj , ci), then we say that ci wins
the pairwise election against cj . A candidate c ∈ C is called the Condorcet winner
if he wins the pairwise elections against all other candidates in C. Note that some
elections may not have a Condorcet winner. We say that a voting rule R is Condorcet-
consistent if for any election E that has a Condorcet winner c we have R(E) = {c}.
1We mention that an earlier version of this paper also included results on Bucklin voting. Unfortunately,
the proofs contained errors and thus we removed the section on Bucklin from the paper.
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Two examples of Condorcet-consistent rules are Copeland and maximin, defined as
follows. For any rational α ∈ [0, 1], Copeland α grants one point to a candidate ci ∈ C
for each pairwise elections that ci wins, and α points for each pairwise election that
ci ties. The maximin score of ci is the number of votes that ci receives in her worst
pairwise election, i.e., mincj∈C\{ci}NE(ci, cj).
We denote by ScRE (c) the R-score of a candidate c ∈ C in an election E = (C, V ); we omit
the superscript R when the voting rule is clear from the context.
The Shift Bribery Problem. This section is based on the definitions from [4]. Consider
an election E = (C, V ) with C = {p, c1, . . . , cm−1}, V = (v
1, . . . , vn). Suppose that our goal
is to ensure that the designated candidate p is a winner of the election under a voting rule
R. In order to achieve this goal, we can ask each voter vi to shift p upwards in her vote
by a certain number of positions. This models the fact that we can campaign in favor
of p. However, each such shift has a cost. Specifically, each voter vi has a cost function
πi : Z+ → Z+, where πi(k), k ∈ Z+, is the cost of shifting p upwards by k positions in
≻i. We require that each πi, i = 1, . . . , n, satisfies πi(0) = 0 and πi(k) ≤ πi(k + 1) for
k ∈ Z+. Also, when vi ranks p in position t, we require πi(s) = πi(t− 1) for all s ≥ t; thus,
the function πi is fully specified by its values at 1, . . . , t − 1. Note that we assume that
πi(k) < ∞ for all i = 1, . . . , n and k ∈ Z+. However, all our proofs can be generalized to
the case where πi can be +∞ (i.e., some voters cannot be bribed to move p by more than
some given number of positions). We seek an action that makes p a winner at the minimum
cost.
Definition 2.1. Let R be a voting rule. An instance of R-shift-bribery problem is
a tuple I = (C, V,Π, p), where C = {p, c1, . . . , cm−1}, V = (v
1, . . . , vn) is a collection of
preference orders over C, Π = (π1, . . . , πn) is a family of cost functions, and p ∈ C is a
designated candidate. The goal is to find a minimal value b such that there is a sequence
t = (t1, . . . , tn) ∈ (Z
+)n with the following properties: (a) b =
∑n
i=1 π
i(ti), and (b) if for
each i = 1, . . . , n we shift p upwards in the i-th vote by ti positions, then p becomes an
R-winner of E. We denote this value of b by opt(I).
In weighted R-shift-bribery, the description of the instance includes a vector of
voters’ weights w = (w1, . . . , wn), i.e., we have I = (C, V,Π, p,w).
We will call the sequence t = (t1, . . . , tn) a shift-action. Let shf (C, V, t) denote the
election obtained from (C, V ) by shifting p upwards by ti positions in the i-th vote (or
placing p on top of that vote, if vi ranks p in position t < ti + 1 before the bribery). A
shift-action is successful if p is a winner of shf (C, V, t). Additionally, let Π(t) =
∑n
i=1 π
i(ti).
Let I = (C, V,Π, p) be an instance of R-shift-bribery and let t = (t1, . . . , tn). Over-
loading notation, we let shf (I, t) denote an instance Iˆ = (C, Vˆ , Πˆ, p) of R-shift-bribery
given by (a) (C, Vˆ ) = shf (C, V, t), and (b) Πˆ = (πˆ1, . . . , πˆn) where for each i = 1, . . . , n we
have πˆi(k) = πi(k + ti) − π
i(ti). That is, shf (I, t) represents the instance of shift bribery
obtained from I by applying the shift-action t; the costs are modified to reflect the fact
that some shifts have already been performed.
4
Given an instance I of R-shift-bribery or weighted R-shift-bribery, we denote
by |I| the representation size of I assuming that all entries of Π (and w, for the weighted
case) are given in binary. Similarly, |~α| denotes the number of bits in the binary encoding
of a scoring vector ~α.
3 Scoring Rules
In this section, we describe a 2-approximation algorithm that works for all scoring rules.
Theorem 3.1. There is an algorithm B that given a scoring rule ~α = (α1, . . . , αm) and
an instance I = (C, V,Π, p) of R~α-shift-bribery with |C| = m, outputs a successful shift-
action t for I that satisfies Π(t) ≤ 2opt(I), and runs in time poly(|I|, |~α|).
We split the proof of Theorem 3.1 into three steps. First (Proposition 3.3) we describe
a pseudopolynomial 2-approximation algorithm A for our problem. Then (Proposition 3.5)
we use A to construct another algorithm A′, which for any ε > 0 produces a (2 + ε)-
approximation and runs in time polynomial in the instance size and 1
ε
. Finally, we convert
A′ into a 2-approximation algorithm by bootstrapping. Throughout the proof, we fix a
scoring rule R~α = (α1, . . . , αm).
We first prove a preliminary lemma that will be used to demonstrate the correctness of
our approach.
Lemma 3.2. Let s = (s1, . . . , sn) be a successful shift-action for (C, V,Π, p), and let k =
Scshf (C,V,s)(p)−Sc(C,V )(p). Then every shift-action r = (r1, . . . , rn) such that Scshf (C,V,r)(p) =
Sc(C,V )(p) + 2k is successful for (C, V,Π, p).
Proof. When p is shifted from position i + 1 to position i in some vote ≻j, he obtains
αi − αi+1 extra points, while the candidate c that was in position i in ≻
j prior to the shift
loses αi−αi+1 points; the scores of all other candidates remain unchanged. Since s increases
p’s score by k and p wins in shf (C, V, s), we have maxc∈C [Sc(C,V )(c)−Sc(C,V )(p)] ≤ 2k. Now,
r increases p’s score by 2k points, and does not increase the score of any other candidate,
so the lemma follows.
We are now ready to implement the first step of our plan. The algorithm A presented in
the next proposition is inspired by the 2-approximation algorithm for the Borda rule that
appears in [4]; however, its analysis is substantially different.
Proposition 3.3. There exist an algorithm A that given a scoring rule ~α = (α1, . . . , αm)
and an instance I = (C, V,Π, p) of R~α-shift-bribery with |C| = m, outputs a successful
shift-action t for I that runs in time poly(|I|, |~α|,
∑n
i=1 π
i(m)) and satisfies Π(t) ≤ 2opt(I).
Proof. Consider an instance I = (C, V,Π, p) ofR~α-shift-bribery such that C = {p, c1, . . . , cm−1}
and V = (v1, . . . , vn), and set E = (C, V ). For each integer ℓ ≥ 0, and each instance J =
(C, V ′,Π′, p) of R~α-shift-bribery, set buy(J, ℓ) = shf (C, V
′, tℓ), where tℓ is chosen so as to
maximize p’s score subject to the constraint Π′(tℓ) ≤ ℓ, i.e., tℓ ∈ argmax{Scshf (C,V ′,t)(p) |
Π′(t) ≤ ℓ}.
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procedure A(C, V,Π, p)
begin
Set m = |C|, n = |V |, M =
∑n
i=1 π
i(m), b =∞;
for ℓ1 = 0 to M do
for ℓ2 = 0 to M do
begin
I ′ = buy(I, ℓ1);
I ′′ = buy(I ′, ℓ2);
if p is an R~α-winner in I
′′ and ℓ1 + ℓ2 < b then
set b = ℓ1 + ℓ2;
end
return b;
end
Figure 1: Algorithm A.
Lemma 3.4. For any ℓ ≥ 0, the instance buy(I, ℓ) is computable in time poly(|I|, ℓ).
Proof. For i = 1, . . . , n, k = 0, . . . ,m, let gain i(k) denote the number of points that p gains
from being shifted upwards by k positions in ≻i (or, to the top position in ≻i, if k is too
large).
Our algorithm relies on dynamic programming. For each i = 0, . . . , n, j = 0, . . . , ℓ, let
F (i, j) denote the maximum increase in p’s score that can be achieved by spending exactly
j dollars on bribing the first i voters. If it is impossible to spend exactly j dollars on bribing
the first i voters, set F (i, j) = −∞. Naturally, we have F (0, 0) = 0 and F (0, j) = −∞ for
j = 1, . . . , ℓ. Further, it is easy to see that for each i = 1, . . . , n and j = 0, . . . , ℓ we have
F (i, j) = max{F (i− 1, j − πi(k)) + gaini(k) | k = 0, . . . ,m, j ≥ πi(k)}.
Thus, we can compute F (n, j) for all j = 0, . . . , ℓ in time poly(|I|, ℓ). Now pick a value
j ∈ {0, . . . , ℓ} that maximizes F (n, j). Using standard techniques, we can find a shift-action
t that corresponds to F (n, j). Clearly, we have buy(I, ℓ) = shf (C, V, t). (Lemma 3.4) 
The pseudocode for algorithm A is given in Figure 1. Lemma 3.4 implies that the running
time of A is polynomial in |I| and
∑n
i=1 π
i(m). It remains to show that A indeed produces
a 2-approximate solution.
To this end, we will show that there exist ℓ1, ℓ2 ≤
∑n
i=1 π
i(m) such that I ′ = buy(I, ℓ1),
I ′′ = buy(I ′, ℓ2), p is an R~α-winner in I
′′, and ℓ1 + ℓ2 ≤ 2opt(I).
Let t = (t1, . . . , tn) be an optimal shift-action that ensures p’s victory, that is, Π(t) =
opt(I). Set k = Scshf (C,V,t)(p)− ScE(p).
Consider an instance I ′ obtained from I by spending the total cost of the optimal shift
action greedily, i.e., so as to maximize p’s score. Formally, let ℓ1 = Π(t) and set I
′ =
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buy(I, ℓ1). Let s
′ = (s′1, . . . , s
′
n) be the shift-action that transforms I into I
′ = (C, V ′,Π′, p),
and set E′ = (C, V ′). By construction, we have ScE′(p) ≥ ScE(p) + k.
Let r = (r1, . . . , rn) be the common part of shift-actions t and s
′, i.e., set ri = min{ti, s
′
i}
for i = 1, . . . , n. Let Ir = shf (C, V, r), where Ir = (C, V r,Πr, p), and set Er = (C, V r).
Finally, set ℓ2 = Π
′(t− r), I ′′ = buy(I ′, ℓ2), and let s
′′ = (s′′1 , . . . , s
′′
n) be the shift-action
that transforms I ′ into I ′′ = (C, V ′′,Π′′, p). Let E′′ = (C, V ′′). Observe that for each
i = 1, . . . , n we have either ti − ri = 0, in which case π
′i(ti − ri) = 0, or ti − ri = ti − s
′
i, in
which case π′i(ti − ri) = π
′i(ti − s
′
i) = π
i(ti)− π
i(s′i). Therefore, we have Π
′(t− r) ≤ Π(t).
Now, the total cost of s′+s′′ is given by ℓ1+ℓ2 = Π(t)+Π
′(t−r) ≤ 2Π(t). As Π(t) = opt(I),
we obtain ℓ1 + ℓ2 ≤ 2opt(I). It remains to show that p is a winner in shf (C, V, s
′ + s′′).
Set kr = ScEr(p)− ScE(p). The shift-actions t− r and s
′ − r satisfy
Scshf (C,V r ,t−r)(p) = ScEr(p) + (k − k
r), (1)
Scshf (C,V r ,s′−r)(p) ≥ ScEr(p) + (k − k
r). (2)
We have shf (C, V r, t − r) = shf (C, V, t), so p is an R~α-winner in shf (C, V
r, t − r). Thus,
by Lemma 3.2, any shift-action that increases the score of p in Er by 2(k − kr) points
ensures that p is a winner in the resulting election. We will now show that this holds for the
shift-action s′′+(s′−r), and hence p is a winner in shf (C, V r, s′′+s′−r) = shf (C, V, s′′+s′).
For each i = 1, . . . , n, if ti − ri 6= 0, then ri = s
′
i and the i’th voter ranks p in the same
position both in V ′ and in V r. Thus, Πr(t − r) = Π′(t − r) = ℓ2, and applying t − r to
I ′ increases p’s score by the same amount as applying t − r to Ir. By equation (1), this
implies
Scshf (C,V ′,t−r)(p) = ScE′(p) + (k − k
r). (3)
By definition, s′′ is a shift-action of cost at most ℓ2 = Π
′(t − r) that applied to E′
increases p’s score as much as possible. Thus, equation (3) implies
ScE′′(p) ≥ ScE′(p) + (k − k
r). (4)
Since E′′ = shf (E′, s′′) and E′ = shf (Er, s′ − r), by combining equations (2) and (4) we
obtain the following inequality:
ScE′′(p) ≥ ScE′(p) + (k − k
r)
= Scshf (C,V r,s′−r)(p) + (k − k
r)
≥ ScEr(p) + 2(k − k
r).
Thus, p is a winner in election E′′. This completes the proof of Proposition 3.3.
We will now convert algorithm A into a (2 + ε)-approximation scheme. A natural
approach is to scale the bribery price functions given by Π by a sufficiently large parameter
K. However, the appropriate choice of K depends on the actual value of the optimal
solution. Therefore, we make polynomially many guesses of the value of K.
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Proposition 3.5. There exist an algorithm A′ that given a rational ε > 0, a scoring rule
~α = (α1, . . . , αm) and an instance I = (C, V,Π, p) of R~α-shift-bribery with |C| = m, runs
in time poly(|I|, |~α|, 1
ε
) and outputs a successful shift-action t for I that satisfies Π(t) ≤
(2 + ε)opt(I).
Proof. Let R = maxi∈{1,...,n} π
i(m). Algorithm A′ executes ⌈logR⌉ iterations, each with
a different value ρ, the current estimate of the cost of the most expensive shift. We start
with ρ = 1 and we double it after every iteration. In each iteration we compute some
solution—using algorithm A—and then either discard it or keep it. After the last iteration,
we pick a solution with the lowest cost. Let us now describe a single iteration.
Let ρ be the current guess of the cost of the most expensive shift. Let K = ρε
n
. We
construct an instance J = (C, V,Λ, p), where Λ = (λ1, . . . , λn) is a sequence of shift-bribery
cost functions defined as follows. For each i = 1, . . . , n, j = 0, . . . ,m, we set
λi(j) =
{ ⌈
πi(j)
K
⌉
if πi(j) ≤ ρ,
2(n
2
ε
+ n) + 1 otherwise.
Note that all the values of functions in (λ1, . . . , λn) are polynomially bounded in n and
1
ε
.
Algorithm A solves J in time poly(n, 1
ε
), producing a shift-action s = (s1, . . . , sn). Note
that since I and J differ only in cost functions, s is a valid solution for I. If we have
λi(ti) ≤ 2(
n2
ε
+ n) (equivalently, πi(j) ≤ ρ) for all i = 1, . . . , n, we store solution s for
further use. Otherwise we discard it. Observe that in the last iteration we have ρ ≥ R,
so the solution obtained in that iteration is not discarded. After all iterations have been
computed, we output the cheapest stored solution. Clearly, algorithm A′ runs in polynomial
time. It remains to show that it produces an accurate approximation.
Let t = (t1, . . . , tn) be a shift-action that corresponds to an optimal solution, and let σ
be the cost of the most expensive shift within t, i.e., set σ = maxi=1,...,n π
i(ti). Consider an
iteration in which ρ2 ≤ σ ≤ ρ. Let J = (C, V,Λ, p) be the scaled-down instance used in this
iteration. Note that Λ(t) ≤ n
⌈
σ
K
⌉
≤ n
⌈
ρ
K
⌉
= n
⌈
n
ε
⌉
≤ n
2
ε
+ n. Thus, algorithm A finds a
solution for J with cost (in terms of Λ) at most 2(n
2
ε
+ n), and so this solution certainly is
not discarded.
Let s = (s1, . . . , sn) be the solution produced for J by A. As argued before, s is also
a solution for I. We have Π(t) ≤ Π(s) ≤ KΛ(s) ≤ 2KΛ(t). Indeed, the first inequality
holds because t is an optimal solution for I, the second holds due to definition of Λ, and
the third one holds because s is a 2-approximate solution for J . Due to rounding, for each
i = 1, . . . , n we have
πi(ti) ≤ Kλ
i(ti) = K
⌈
πi(ti)
K
⌉
≤ πi(ti) +K.
Thus, we obtain KΛ(t) ≤ Π(t)+Kn. Using the fact that nK = ρε, we get Π(s) ≤ 2KΛ(t) ≤
2(Π(t) +Kn) ≤ 2Π(t) + 2ρǫ ≤ (2 + 4ε)Π(t). The last inequality follows from the fact that
ρ
2 ≤ Π(t). This completes the proof of Propositon 3.5.
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To complete the proof of Theorem 3.1, we will now convert our (2 + ε)-approximation
scheme into a 2-approximation algorithm using a bootstrapping argument.
Proof of Theorem 3.1. Let I = (C, V,Π, p) be an instance of R~α-shift-bribery, and let
t = (t1, . . . , tn) be an optimal shift-action for I. By the pigeonhole principle, for some
i ∈ {1, . . . , n} we have πi(ti) ≥
1
n
Π(t). Assume for now that we know i and ti (subsequently,
we will show how to get rid of this assumption).
Let d = (0i−1, ti, 0
m−i), and set I ′ = shf (I,d). Clearly, we have opt(I ′) = opt(I)−πi(ti).
Let ε = 1
n
, and let s = (s1, . . . , sn) be the shift action produced by the algorithm A
′
on (I ′, ε). Clearly, p is a winner in shf (I, s + d). Further, by Proposition 3.5, we have
Π(s) ≤ (2+ ε)(Π(t)−πi(ti)). Therefore, the cost of the shift-action s+d can be estimated
as follows:
Π(s+ d) = Π(s) + πi(ti)
≤ (2 + ε)(Π(t) − πi(ti)) + π
i(ti)
≤ 2Π(t) − πi(ti) + εΠ(t)
≤ 2Π(t) + (εΠ(t) −
1
n
Π(t)) = 2Π(t),
where we use the fact that πi(ti) ≥
1
n
Π(t). Thus, s+ d is a 2-approximatite solution.
While we do not know the values of i and ti. there are only n possibilities for the former
and m possibilities for the latter. Thus, our algorithm B will try all of them, and return
the best solution. Since 1
ε
= n, the running time of B is polynomial in |I|.
By using the algorithm B with ~α = (m−1, . . . , 1, 0), we obtain a 2-approximation algorithm
for the Borda rule. This algorithm is different from the one given in [4], even though they
have the same approximation guarantee. Indeed, the algorithm of [4] relies on a different
dynamic programming subroutine, whose running time is polynomial in the instance size
and
∑m
i=1 αi (rather than the instance size and
∑n
i=1 π
i(m), as in our construction). Since
for Borda the expression
∑m
i=1 αi is polynomial in the size of the instance, this immediately
produces a polynomial-time algorithm. It is not hard to see that the algorithm proposed
in [4] can be adapted to work for any scoring rule with
∑m
i=1 αi = poly(m). Of course, such
an algorithm would be considerably faster than the three-step procedure of Theorem 3.1.
Indeed, one may wonder if the more complicated algorithm described above is useful at
all, since the scoring vectors used in practice often have small coordinates. However, an
important feature of our algorithm is that it works even if each voter vi uses his own
scoring vector ~αi. This means that we can adapt it for weighted voters, by replacing a voter
of weight w with a scoring vector (α1, . . . , αm) by a unit-weight voter with a scoring vector
(wα1, . . . , wαm).
Corollary 3.6. There is an algorithm Bw that given a scoring rule ~α and an instance
I = (C, V,Π, p,w) of weighted R~α-shift-bribery, outputs a successful shift-action t for
I that satisfies Π(t) ≤ 2opt(I), and runs in time poly(|I|, |~α|).
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Note that there does not seem to be an easy way to derive Corollary 3.6 from the
result of [4]. Indeed, Corollary 3.6 is quite surprising, as many problems in computational
social choice are known to be hard for weighted voters—in fact, weighted shift-bribery
can be shown to be NP-complete for any nontrivial family of scoring rules. On the other
hand, an efficient algorithm for the weighted case is very useful, as large voter weights are
ubiquitous in campaign management scenarios, where a “voter” corresponds to a collection
of individuals that can be “bribed” by the same promotional activity, or in our sponsored
search example, where the search terms may differ in popularity.
One may also wonder if the algorithm A can be simplified by using a single for-loop,
which for each value of ℓ finds the best shift-action of cost ℓ. In Appendix A, we explore
this question in more detail, showing that the resulting algorithm G is never better than
A, and can sometimes produce a shift-action that is almost twice as expensive as the one
produced by A. However, we do not know if G is nevertheless a 2-approximation algorithm
for our problem.
Finally, we remark that unless P = NP, there is no FPTAS for shift bribery under scor-
ing rules (a direct consequence of the Borda-shift-bribery NP-hardness proof from [4]).
However, we cannot rule out the possibility that there exist approximation algorithms for
Borda-shift-bribery whose approximation ratio is less than two.
4 Copeland and Maximin
Paper [4] shows that the decision version of the shift-bribery problem is NP-hard for
Copelandα for any rational α ∈ [0, 1] as well as for maximin. We will now give m-
approximation algorithms for shift-bribery under Copelandα with rational α ∈ [0, 1] and
maximin. We then show how to improve the approximation ratio for maximin to O(logm).
Finally, we argue that the O(logm) approximation ratio for maximin is asymptotically
tight, and show how our results can be adapted to the weighted setting.
Under Copeland and maximin, the winner is selected on the basis of the outcomes of
pairwise comparisons between the candidates. Thus, these rules can be defined in the so-
called irrational voter model. In this model, the preferences of each voter i are given by her
preference table, which is an antisymmetric m×m matrix whose entry (j, k) is 1 if i prefers
cj to ck and −1 otherwise. Clearly, a preference order can be converted into a preference
table, but the converse is not true, as preference tables can encode cyclic preferences.
Faliszewski et al. [7] adapt the notion of bribery to the irrational voter model; the
resulting notion is known as microbribery (see next paragraph for a formal definition).
Moreover, they show that Copelandα-microbribery is in P for α ∈ {0, 1}. We will first give
a poly-time algorithm for a special case of Copelandα-microbribery for all α ∈ [0, 1] ∩Q,
and—based on this result—derive an m-approximation algorithm for Copelandα-shift-
bribery. Then, we will argue that our technique can be used to convert exact algorithms for
microbribery into m-approximation algorithms for shift bribery for many other voting
rules, including maximin. Finally, we will show an O(logm)-approximation algorithm for
shift-bribery in maximin and argue it is asymptotically optimal.
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First of all, we need to describe microbribery [7] precisely. Let R be a voting rule defined
in the irrational voter model, i.e., a mapping that for any collection of preference tables
over a given set of candidates outputs a subset of the candidates. In the R-microbribery
problem we are given an election E = (C, V ), where C = {p, c1, . . . , cm−1} and V =
(v1, . . . , vn) is a collection of voters specified by their preference tables. Also, for each
i = 1, . . . , n, we have a price function δi : C2 → Z+ ∪ {+∞}, where δi(cj , ck) is the cost
of flipping the (j, k)-th entry in the preference table of vi (i.e., if prior to the bribery we
have cj ≻
i ck, then after the flip we obtain ck ≻
i cj , and vice versa). We require the
price functions to be symmetric, i.e., for each i = 1, . . . , n and all cj , ck ∈ C we require
δi(cj , ck) = δ
i(ck, cj). Further, we require δ
i(cj , cj) = 0 for all i = 1, . . . , n and all cj ∈ C.
The goal is to compute a set of flips S = (S1, . . . , Sn) in the voters’ preference tables that
makes p an R-winner of the election at minimum cost. We identify each flip with the pair
of candidates being flipped, so we have Si ⊆ C × C for all i = 1, . . . , n. We denote an
instance M of R-microbribery by (C, V,∆, p), where ∆ is the sequence (δ1, . . . , δn) of
microbribery price functions. Also, we let ∆(S) denote the total cost of flips in S, i.e., we
set
∆(S) =
n∑
i=1
∑
(cj ,ck)∈Si
δi(cj , ck).
Faliszewski et al. [7] have shown that Copelandα-microbribery is in P for α ∈ {0, 1}.
However, it is not clear if their algorithm can be extended for all α ∈ [0, 1] ∩Q. Therefore,
instead of using the result of [7] directly, we will now prove that Copelandα-microbribery
is in P for all α ∈ [0, 1]∩Q as long as the only permissible flips are the ones that involve the
manipulator’s preferred candidate p. We will then show that for all α ∈ [0, 1] ∩ Q, finding
an m-approximate solution for Copelandα-shift-bribery can be reduced to solving an
instance of Copelandα-microbribery that satisfies this constraint.
Lemma 4.1. For any α ∈ [0, 1] ∩ Q, Copelandα-microbribery is in P for all instances
M = (C, V,∆, p) with |C| = m, |V | = n such that for any i = 1, . . . , n and any two
cj , ck ∈ C, it holds that if p 6∈ {cj , ck} then δ
i(cj , ck) = +∞.
Proof. Fix α ∈ [0, 1] ∩ Q, and let M = (C, V,∆, p) be our input instance of Copelandα-
microbribery. Assume that C = {p, c1, . . . , cm−1}, and let E = (C, V ).
Our algorithm works as follows. For all i = 0, . . . ,m and all j = 0, . . . ,m, we compute
k(i, j) = i+ αj, and check whether ScE(p) ≤ k(i, j) ≤ m− 1. If this condition is satisfied,
we find a minimum-cost microbribery S(i, j) that ensures that p has k(i, j) points and every
other candidate has at most k(i, j) points; if no such microbribery exists, we declare the cost
of S(i, j) to be +∞. In the end, we output the cheapest microbribery found. Observe that
setting i = m− 1, j = 0 results in a successful microbribery of finite cost in which p wins
every pairwise election. Thus, we are guaranteed to output a microbribery of finite cost.
This approach is clearly correct and it remains to show how to compute the microbribery
S(i, j) for each pair (i, j).
Let us fix a pair (i, j) such that ScE(p) ≤ k(i, j) ≤ m− 1. Since we can only flip entries
of preference tables that involve p, for each candidate ck ∈ C we can decrease ck’s score by
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either 1 or 1 − α (if ck wins the pairwise election with p) or by α (if ck ties the pairwise
election with p). In each case it is easy to compute the cheapest way of achieving this. Thus,
for each ck ∈ C, if ScE(ck) > k(i, j), we perform the cheapest microbribery that involves
preference table entries for p and ck and brings ck’s score down to k(i, j) or below; clearly,
if this is impossible, then for this pair (i, j) a microbribery with the required properties
does not exist. After this step, each candidate ck ∈ C \ {p} has at most k(i, j) points and
it remains to find the cheapest microbribery that ensures that p has exactly k(i, j) points.
This can easily be done by using standard dynamic programming techniques.
We will now use Lemma 4.1 to obtain an m-approximation algorithm for shift-bribery
under Copelandα, where α ∈ [0, 1] ∩Q.
Theorem 4.2. There exists a poly-time algorithm that given an instance I = (C, V,Π, p)
of Copelandα-shift-bribery with α ∈ [0, 1] ∩Q and |C| = m outputs a shift-action s such
that p is a winner in shf (C, V, s) and Π(s) ≤ m · opt(I).
Proof. Fix an α ∈ [0, 1] ∩ Q and an instance I = (C, V,Π, p) of Copelandα-shift-bribery
with C = {p, c1, . . . , cm−1}, V = (v
1, . . . , vn). For each i = 1, . . . , n, assume that the
preference order of a voter vi is given by
cji,k(i) ≻ cji,k(i)−1 ≻ · · · ≻ cji,1 ≻ p ≻ · · · .
Our algorithm first converts I into an instanceM = (C, Vˆ ,∆, p) of Copelandα-microbribery.
The list Vˆ contains n voters. The preference table of each voter vˆi is constructed from the
preference ordering of vi: we set the (j, k)-th entry of vˆi’s preference table to 1 if and only
if cj ≻
i ck.
The price functions ∆ = (δ1, . . . , δn) are defined as follows. For each i = 1, . . . , n and
all ℓ = 1, . . . , k(i), we set δi(p, cji,ℓ) = δ
i(cji,ℓ , p) = π
i(ℓ). For all other pairs of candidates,
we set the value of δi to be ∞.
Note that the resulting instance of Copelandα-microbribery satisfies the conditions
of Lemma 4.1. Therefore, we can use Lemma 4.1 to compute an optimal solution to M .
It is easy to see that there is a solution to M which does not involve flipping any of the
preference-table entries with cost ∞. Therefore, an optimal solution to M is a sequence
S = (S1, . . . , Sn), where for each i = 1, . . . , n the set Si consists of flips that involve p and
candidates in cji,1 , . . . , cji,k(i) only.
We derive a shift-action s = (s1, . . . , sn) from S as follows. For each i = 1, . . . , n, we
set si = 0 if Si ∩ {cji,1 , . . . , cji,k(i)} = ∅, and si = max{ℓ | cji,ℓ ∈ S
′
i} otherwise. It is easy to
see that since S is a solution for M , s is a shift-action that ensures that p is a winner in I.
Further, we have
Π(s) ≤ ∆(S). (5)
Our algorithm outputs s. It remains to show that ∆(S) ≤ m · opt(I).
Let t = (t1, . . . , tn) be an optimal-cost shift-action that ensures p’s victory in I. From t,
we can derive a solution T = (T1, . . . , Tn) to M as follows. For each i = 1, . . . , n, if ti = 0,
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we set Ti = ∅, and otherwise we set
Ti = {(p, cji,1), (p, cji,2), . . . , (p, cji,ti )}.
Since applying the shift-action t to I makes p a winner, applying T to M makes p a winner
in M as well. Naturally, since S is an optimal solution for M , we have
∆(S) ≤ ∆(T ). (6)
For each i = 1, . . . , n, let δi(Ti) =
∑
(p,c)∈Ti
δi(p, c). We have
δi(Ti) =
∑
(p,c)∈Ti
δi(p, c) =
ti∑
ℓ=1
δi(p, cji,ℓ) =
ti∑
ℓ=1
πi(ℓ) ≤ tiπ
i(ti) ≤ mπ
i(ti). (7)
Consequently, ∆(T ) ≤ mΠ(t). Combining this inequality with (5) and (6), we obtain
Π(s) ≤ ∆(S) ≤ ∆(T ) ≤ mΠ(t).
Since t is an optimal solution for I, the shift-action s is an m-approximate solution for I.
The algorithm clearly works in polynomial time.
The proof of Theorem 4.2 can also be adapted for maximin (using the result of [4],
where the authors show that maximin-microbribery is in P), and, more generally, for
any other rule that is defined for irrational voters, has a polynomial-time microbribery
algorithm (at least for the instances constructed in the proof), and satisfies a certain form
of monotonicity (we will not formalize this notion of monotonicity; essentially, the voting
rule has to guarantee that our algorithm’s translations between microbribery solutions and
shift-bribery solutions keep p a winner).
To extend these approximability results for Copeland and maximin to the case of
weighted voters, we use essentially the same strategy as in the proof of Theorem 3.1. That
is, we first show that both weighted Copeland-microbribery and weighted Maximin-
microbribery admit an FPTAS as long as the input instances satisfy the condition of
Lemma 4.1. We then use this FPTAS as an oracle inside the algorithm described in the
proof of Theorem 4.2 to obtain an m(1 + ε)-approximation scheme for our problems. We
then use the idea presented in the proof of Theorem 3.1 to convert this approximation
scheme into an m-approximation algorithm. As in the proof of Proposition 3.5, the FP-
TAS proceeds by executing ⌈log
∑n
i=1
∑m−1
j=1 δ
i(p, cj)⌉ iterations that correspond to different
guesses of the cost of the optimal microbribery. In iteration i, we set ρ = 2i−1, and round
all bribery prices that do not exceed ρ up to the nearest multiple of ερ, where ε is the
given error parameter; all prices that exceed ρ are set to +∞. We then find an optimal
microbribery S(ρ) for the rounded prices, and discard it if its cost is too large relative to ρ.
For the rounded prices, the optimal microbribery for both Copeland and maximin is easy
to find, and the cost of the best non-discarded microbribery provides a good approximation
to the cost of the optimal microbribery.
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Interestingly, our FPTAS for Copelandα only works for the instances of weighted
Copelandα-microbribery that satisfy the condition of Lemma 4.1. Indeed we can show
that, in general, weighted Copelandα-microbribery is inapproximable up to any factor
for all rational α < 1. This result holds even if there are only three candidates.
Proposition 4.3. For all rational α < 1 and any K, there does not exist a poly-time
K-approximation algorithm for weighted Copelandα-microbribery unless P = NP.
Proof. The reduction is from Partition. An instance of Partition is given by a list
of n positive integers A = (a1, . . . , an). It is a “yes”-instance if there is a set of indices
J ⊆ {1, . . . , n} such that
∑
i∈J ai =
1
2
∑n
i=1 ai, and a “no”-instance otherwise.
Given an instance A = (a1, . . . , as) of Partition, we set
∑n
i=1 ai = 2B, and construct
an instance of weighted Copelandα-microbribery as follows. There are s + 2 voters
(v1, . . . , vs, vs+1, vs+2) with weights (a1, . . . , as, B,B), and three candidates a, b and p,
where p is the briber’s preferred candidate. The voter’s preferences are set as follows.
Voters vs+1 and vs+2 prefer p to any other candidate; further, vs+1 prefers a to b, and
vs+2 prefers b to a. All other voters prefer a and b to p, and a to b. Further, for voters
vs+1 and vs+2 the cost of any flip is +∞, while for i = 1, . . . , s we have δi(a, b) = 0,
δi(a, p) = δi(b, p) = +∞.
In this instance, p’s score is 2α, a’s score is α+ 1, and b’s score is α. The only way for
p to win is to ensure that all candidates have 2α points, i.e., there is a tie between a and b.
Clearly, this can only be done if we started with a “yes”-instance of Partition.
For the remainder of this section let us return to unweighted shift bribery and maximin.
We have already shown that maximin-shift bribery can be solved in polynomial-time
with a linear approximation ratio, and now we will show that, in fact, a logarithmic one
is possible and asymptotically optimal. The most important building block of our new
maximin algorithm is a result of Caragiannis et al. [3] proved in the context of computing
the Dodgson score. Thus, let us now describe this result and then show how it can be
applied to maximin-shift-bribery.
Given an election E = (C, V ), the Dodgson score of a candidate c ∈ C is the minimum
number of positions by which c needs to be shifted upwards in the preference orders of the
voters in V to become a Condorcet winner. Observe that the Dodgson score of a candidate
is exactly the cost of shift bribery that makes c a Condorcet winner, assuming that each
unit shift has a unit cost.
It is known that determining whether a candidate is a winner in Dodgson elections
is an NP-hard problem [1] (in fact, it is Θp2-complete [8]). Caragiannis et al. [3] gave a
polynomial-time O(logm)-approximation algorithm for computing Dodgson scores. In fact,
their algorithm is somewhat more general and the next theorem is a direct consequence of
the results in [3].
Theorem 4.4. There is an algorithm F that given an instance I = (C, V,Π, p) of R-shift-
bribery with |C| = m and a sequence k1, . . . , km−1 of nonnegative integers, computes a
shift-action t that has the following properties:
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1. For each i = 1, . . . ,m− 1, Nshf (C,V,t)(p, ci) ≥ min(N(C,V )(p, ci) + ki, |V |).
2. Π(t) = O(logm)Π(s), where s is a minimal-cost shift-action that satisfies the above
condition.
We can now use Theorem 4.4 to give a polynomial-time O(logm)-approximation al-
gorithm for maximin-shift-bribery. The main idea of our approach is that, for a given
instance I of maximin-shift-bribery, it is easy to provide a description of an optimal
shift-action in the format of Theorem 4.4.
Theorem 4.5. There exists a poly-time algorithm that given an instance I = (C, V,Π, p)
of maximin-shift-bribery with |C| = m outputs a shift-action s such that p is a winner
in shf (C, V, s) and Π(s) = O(logm) · opt(I).
Proof. Let I be our input instance as in the statement of the theorem and let E = (C, V ).
Our algorithm executes a series of iterations, one for each value k, ScE(p) ≤ k ≤ |V |. The
goal of the iteration for value k is to find a shift-action rk = (rk1 , . . . , r
k
n) that (a) ensures
that the score of p is at least k and the score of each candidate c ∈ C \ {p} is at most k,
and (b) Π(rk) is within O(logm) of the cost of an optimal-cost shift-action that achieves
(a). Given the shift-actions produced in these iterations, the algorithm outputs one with
the lowest cost. Since the optimal shift-action for I is an optimal shift-action for one of the
iterations, this algorithm outputs an O(logm)-approximate solution for I. It remains to
show how to execute the iterations.
Let us now fix value k, ScE(p) ≤ k ≤ |V |, and describe the iteration for k. Let us
assume that C = {p, c1, . . . , cm−1}. Since a shift-action can move p only, via applying some
shift action r = (r1, . . . , rn) to E we can affect each of the values NE(p, c1), . . . , NE(p, cm−1)
but neither of the values NE(ci, cj) for ci, cj ∈ C.
Thus, shift-action rk has to satisfy the following conditions. First, for each i = 1, . . . ,m−
1 we require Nshf (C,V,rk)(p, ci) ≥ k. This guarantees that the maximin score of p is at least
k. Second, for each ci ∈ C \ {p} such that ScE(ci) > k, we require Nshf (C,V,rk)(ci, p) < k,
which is equivalent to demanding that Nshf (C,V,rk)(p, ci) ≥ |V | − k. This guarantees that
the score of each candidate in C \{p} is at most k. We see that these two requirements can
easily be phrased in terms of the input to the algorithm of Theorem 4.4. Thus, we compute
rk using Theorem 4.4. Clearly, the resulting shift action rk satisfies our requirements. Since
rk can be computed in polynomial time, the proof is complete.
We remark that the approximation guaranteee given by Theorem 4.5 is asymptotically
optimal. This follows from the fact that the reduction of exact-cover-by-3-sets to
maximin-shift-bribery given in [4] can be modified to reduce from set-cover, in a way
that allows maximin-shift-bribery to inherit the inapproximability properties of set-
cover (see [9] for inapproximability results for set-cover).
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5 Inapproximability of Swap Bribery
In contrast to shift bribery, swap bribery is hard to approximate up to an arbitrary factor
for all voting rules for which the possible winner problem is hard; this includes almost all
scoring rules, and, in particular, k-approval for k ≥ 2 and Borda [2], Copeland [10], and
maximin [10]. Indeed, in the reduction from the possible winner problem to swap bribery,
the resulting instance of swap bribery has a bribery of cost 0 if and only if the original
instance of the possible winner problem is a “yes”-instance. Thus, any approximation
algorithm for swap bribery can be used to decide the possible winner problem.
6 Conclusions
We have presented approximation algorithms for campaign management under a number of
voting rules. Most of our results hold even for weighted voters. We believe that designing
algorithms for the case of weighted voters is important, since in realistic campaign manage-
ment scenarios a “voter” to be bribed is usually a group of voters that can be reached by
the same ad. By the same token, it would be interesting to extend our results to settings
where we can reach several non-identical voters with the same ad; this would correspond to
shift bribery with “bulk discounts”. Another, more applied direction would be to identify
commercial campaign management scenarios (where candidates correspond to services or
products) that can be handled using our model; the sponsored search example is the intro-
duction is the first step in that direction. Finally, a natural direction for further study is
to design efficient algorithms for shift bribery with better approximation ratios, or to prove
that our results are (asymptotically) optimal.
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A Analysis of a single-pass variant of A
A counterintuitive property of the algorithm A described in Section 3 is that it uses two
for-loops instead of one. That is, it splits the money to be spent into two parts ℓ1 and
ℓ2, greedily selects a shift-action s
′ that maximizes p’s score given the budget ℓ1, and then
greedily selects a shift-action s′′ for shf (C, V, s′) given the budget ℓ2. It is natural to ask if
a “greedy” single-pass algorithm given in Figure 2 is still a 2-approximation algorithm for
our problem.
It is easy to see that each shift-action considered by G is also considered by A, so G
never produces a better solution than A. However, the converse is not true. Indeed, we
will now show that the solution produced by G can be almost twice as expensive as the one
produced by A.
Theorem A.1. For any ε > 0, there is an instance I = (C, V,Π, p) of Borda-shift-
bribery such that Π(G(I)) ≥ (2− ε)Π(A(I)).
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procedure G(C, V,Π, p)
begin
Set m = |C|, n = |V |, M =
∑n
i=1 π
i(m), b =∞;
for ℓ = 0 to M do
begin
I ′ = buy(I, ℓ);
if p is an R-winner in I ′ and ℓ < b then
b = ℓ;
end
return b;
end
Figure 2: Algorithm G.
Proof. Given an ε > 0, set k = ⌈1
ε
⌉, and let T = 2k. We will now construct an instance I
of Borda-shift-bribery with opt(I) = 2kT , such that A(I) outputs an optimal solution,
while G(I) finds a solution of cost 4kT−3k. As we have 4kT−3k > 4kT−4k = 2kT (2− 2
T
) >
2kT (2− ε), this suffices to prove the theorem.
To construct the instance I = (C, V,Π, p), we set C = {p, c, a1, . . . , a4k} and V =
(v1, . . . , v4k+2). The voters have the following preferences. For i = 1, . . . , 2k, v2i−1 has
preference order c ≻ p ≻ a1 ≻ a2 ≻ · · · ≻ a4k and v
2i has preference order c ≻ p ≻
a4k ≻ a4k−1 ≻ · · · ≻ a1. Voters v
4k+1 and v4k+2 have preference orders c ≻ a4k ≻ a4k−1 ≻
· · · ≻ a1 ≻ p and p ≻ a1 ≻ a2 ≻ · · · ≻ a4k ≻ c, respectively. Let E = (C, V ). It is easy
to verify that the candidates have the following Borda scores: ScE(p) = 16k
2 + 4k + 1,
ScE(c) = (16k
2 + 4k + 1) + 4k, and ScE(ai) = 8k
2 + 2k + 1 for i = 1, . . . , 4k. That is, c
beats p by 4k points, but p has more points than any other candidate.
We will now define the sequence Π = (π1, . . . , π4k+2) of price functions. Since the voters
v1, . . . , v4k rank p second, we can fully specify πi for i = 1, . . . , 4k by setting πi(1) = T .
Similarly, since v4k+2 ranks p first, the function πi is fully described by setting π4k+2(0) = 0.
The price function π4k+1 is defined as follows. We have π4k+1(0) = 0 and for each j,
1 ≤ j ≤ 4k + 1, it holds that:
π4k+1(j) − π4k+1(j − 1) =


0 if j = 0,
T + 1 if j = 1,
T if 2 ≤ j ≤ k
T − 2 if j = k + 1
T − 1 if k + 2 ≤ j ≤ 4k + 1
It is easy to see that minimal-cost solutions involve shifting our preferred candidate
p upwards by one position in the preference orders of 2k voters among those in V ′ =
(v1, . . . , v4k): each such shift gives p one extra point and takes away one point from c.
Thus, opt(I) = 2kT .
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Algorithm A successfully finds an optimal solution. Indeed, any shift-action of cost kT
can increase p’s score in I by at most k and to achieve this, we need to shift p upwards by
one position in some k votes chosen from V ′. Let I ′ be the instance obtained by this action.
In I ′, the shift-action of cost kT that maximizes p’s score is obtained by shifting p upwards
by one position in the votes of the k “unshifted” voters from V ′. Thus, for ℓ1 = ℓ2 = kT ,
A finds an optimal solution.
On the other hand, algorithm G outputs the shift-action (0, . . . , 0, 4k, 0) of cost T +
1 + (k − 1)T + 3k(T − 1) − 1 = 4kT − 3k. Indeed, if ℓ ≤ kT , the subroutine buy(I, ℓ)
shifts p upwards by one position in the preference orders of ⌊ ℓ
T
⌋ voters among V ′. On the
other hand, if ℓ > kT , buy(I, ℓ) shifts p upwards as much as possible given the budget ℓ in
the preference order of v4k+1 (recall that buy(I, ℓ) selects the cheapest shift-action among
those that maximize p’s score without exceeding cost ℓ). Moreover, by Lemma 3.2, the shift
(0, . . . , 0, 4k, 0) makes p a winner, as it increases its score by 4k points, whereas the optimal
solution increases p’s score by 2k points.
Note that for the family of instances given in the proof of Theorem A.1, A actually
produces an optimal solution, so G still provides a factor 2 approximation in this case. In
fact, it is not clear whether G is a 2-approximation algorithm for shift bribery with respect
to the class of all scoring rules. Note, however, that G may behave very differently from A:
in the proof of Theorem A.1, the shift-actions produced by G and A are completely disjoint.
Thus, even if G happens to be a 2-approximation algorithm for our problem, the proof that
it achieves this approximation ratio is very likely to require additional insights.
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